Mad as March Hares:  Kaiser Wilhelm II, Great Britain, and the Road to War by Kelly, Jeffrey
Bridgewater State University
Virtual Commons - Bridgewater State University
Honors Program Theses and Projects Undergraduate Honors Program
5-12-2015
"Mad as March Hares:" Kaiser Wilhelm II, Great
Britain, and the Road to War
Jeffrey Kelly
Follow this and additional works at: http://vc.bridgew.edu/honors_proj
Part of the History Commons
This item is available as part of Virtual Commons, the open-access institutional repository of Bridgewater State University, Bridgewater, Massachusetts.
Recommended Citation
Kelly, Jeffrey. (2015). "Mad as March Hares:" Kaiser Wilhelm II, Great Britain, and the Road to War. In BSU Honors Program Theses
and Projects. Item 113. Available at: http://vc.bridgew.edu/honors_proj/113














“Mad as March Hares:” 










Submitted in Partial Completion of the  
Requirements of Departmental Honors in History 
 
 
Bridgewater State University 
 
 










Dr. Leonid Heretz, Thesis Director 
Dr. Sarah Wiggins, Committee Member 






















“You English… are mad, mad, mad as March hares. What has come over you that you are so 
completely given over to suspicions quite unworthy of a great nation? What more can I do than I 
have done? I declared with all the emphasis at my command, in my speech at Guildhall, that my 
heart is set upon peace, and that it is one of my dearest wishes to live on the best of terms with 
England. Have I ever been false to my word?” – Emperor William II, in an interview with the 
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  Few were as criticized or reviled by their contemporaries as was Kaiser Wilhelm II – 
more properly in English “Emperor William II” – of Germany. Held responsible for the outbreak 
of the First World War by his enemies during it and by many of his own people after it, William 
II went down in history as a war-monger, the man who desired and instigated the conflagration 
of Europe. During his reign, nearly every action he performed, nearly every word he spoke, was 
seen as an attack on another nation, or an aggressive assertion of German power. Chief among 
the nations who perceived these attacks and were seen as the victims of them was Great Britain, 
a nation with whom William II shared many blood ties. In the end, it was the relations between 
the Emperor and Great Britain that would play a key role in the outbreak of war. This paper will 
explore these relations through an examination of a series of pivotal events in which William II 
was a key player, and a study of British perceptions of these same events. 
 William II’s memoirs are cited frequently throughout this paper. Though his thoughts – 
recorded after Germany lost the First World War – are undoubtedly self-justifying, they have 
been evaluated in light of other evidence. Further, the Emperor’s statements are used because 
this paper is in part a study of his personality. However, in instances where no corroborating 
evidence was found, it is made clear that the statement or event in question was William II’s 
version of it. 
 The world welcomed the man who would be charged with seeking its destruction on 
January 27, 1859, in Potsdam, the ancestral home of the Hohenzollerns, the ruling family of 
Prussia. He was born to Victoria – the eldest daughter of Great Britain’s revered Queen Victoria 
– and her husband Frederick III, Crown Prince of Prussia and heir to the German Imperial 
throne. As is now known, William II’s was a very difficult birth; he was in the breech position.1 
In an effort to spare his mother further pain and to ensure the child’s survival, doctors had to use 
                                                
1 The Real Kaiser Bill: Wilhelm II of Germany, television documentary, 1998, Manchester: Granada Television. 
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surgical tongs to pull William II into the world.2 To do this, they gripped his arms and pulled.3 
Unfortunately, this resulted in severe damage to the muscles and nerves in the child’s neck and 
left arm.4 His arm was never to grow or function properly, and would serve as a great source of 
difficulty and insecurity in the future emperor’s life.5 
 William II’s insecurity over the appearance and functioning of his withered left arm help 
explain the development of his character, which would later prove so decisive in his relations 
with England. On the subject, Prince Wilhelm Karl, the grandson of William II, said of his 
grandfather in an interview for the documentary The Real Kaiser Bill: Wilhelm II of Germany, 
“In his heart of hearts I think he was a weak and insecure man who tried to compensate by being 
outspoken.”6 In the same documentary, Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, the great-grandson of the 
Kaiser, offered his own views on his forebear’s disability, saying “But at that time, to have a 
disability was a disaster. The people were not called disabled, but they were simply called 
cripples.… And a cripple in his position, being the future emperor of Germany, being the head of 
the army, it was a complete catastrophe.”7 In an effort to compensate for his disability and 
insecurity, William II developed an overtly bombastic nature, which colored many of his 
speeches and declarations. Additionally, as the head of the German army was meant to be 
healthy, fit, and the picture of masculinity, William II developed an obsession with German 
military power, and often maintained the appearance of a warlord in public to compensate for his 
arm. All of these things would later lead to a souring of relations with Britain as his actions were 









viewed by many in the island nation through a lens of suspicion with no thought to the 
underlying causes of the Emperor’s character. 
 Of further concern to many British onlookers was the upbringing of William II. His 
mother and father tried in vain to instill in him the same liberal and progressive values that they 
held, so that he could reform Germany when it came time for him to rule.8 Instead, William II 
rejected these ideals. He was politically raised by his grandfather, Emperor William I, and 
Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. In him they instilled unshakable conservative and autocratic 
values, and a certainty that he was to rule by divine right. Further, as A. Maurice Low, an 
observer in The Atlantic Monthly pointed out, “[William II] had been brought up under the eye of 
his grandfather, who was a soldier and not a statesman…”9 This, coupled with his aggressive 
nature and obsession with the German army, would have given life to the fear of some observers 
in Britain that William II would seek to use force to achieve his goals. 
It was through this lens of fear that many in England viewed William II as he acceded to 
the throne on June 15, 1888, following the death of his father Frederick III after only 99 days as 
Emperor. The hopes of many Liberals both in Germany and in England for Germany’s 
reformation died, and fears of where the young William II would lead Europe sprang up. This 
view and this fear for the future of Europe was held by many in the English press, particularly 
political cartoonists, who were keen to damn him before his reign even truly began. Cartoonist 
Matthew Summerville Morgan portrayed William II in such a way in the June 27, 1888, issue of 
the magazine Judy in a piece called “The Lost Hero.”10 A bust of Frederick III surrounded on all 
sides by wreathes from the nations of Europe and weeping angels dominates the left side of the 
                                                
8 Ibid. 
9 A. Maurice Low, "The German Emperor," The Atlantic Monthly, (March 1906): 302. 
10 Richard Scully, British Images of Germany: Admiration, Antagonism & Ambivalence, 1860-1914 (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 214. 
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cartoon.11 To the right and slightly in the background stands William II, raising his sword and 
imperial standard to a horizon over which hangs the word “war.”12 In a similar piece entitled 
“The New Emperor” in the June 23, 1888, issue of Fun magazine, John Gordon Thompson 
portrays William II as a child, blowing a trumpet and banging a drum labeled “war” while a 
woman representing the whole of Europe looks on in frustration, covering her ears.13 
Perhaps the most chillingly prophetic British cartoon is a piece called “A Wise Warning” 
by John Tenniel for the October 6, 1888, issue of Punch magazine.14 In it, the young Emperor 
William II is represented as the character Icarus from Greek mythology, standing at the edge of a 
cliff with wings held high as he prepares to take flight.15 Beside him stands Bismarck as 
Daedalus, the “Political parent of Wilhelm Icarus,” according to the cartoon.16 Behind them in 
the cloudy sky emerges the sun, crowned with the word “Caesarism.”17 Bismarck warns William 
II not to fly too high – lest he fall victim to the sun of Caesarism – nor too low – urging him not 
to turn to the sea, “nor on boötes gaze;” he instead calls on the young William II to follow his 
guidance and take the middle course.18 As time will tell, and as will be addressed later in this 
paper, William II in fact disregards Bismarck’s advice, breaks with him, then both “flies” closer 
to the sun of Caesarism and turns to the sea. This particular piece is included on the following 
page. 
The British government, on the other hand, proved to be more cordial than the British 
press – at least publicly – towards William II as he began his reign. Instead of condemning him, 
  
                                                
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., 217. 










Parliament extended its condolences for the death of Frederick III to him, his mother Victoria, 
and the entire German people in a joint resolution from both the House of Lords and the House 
of Commons on June 18, 1888.19 To this William II responded warmly, thanking the Parliament 
for their sympathy.20 
The condemnation in the British press of William II as desiring war even as he took the 
throne is countered by the words and actions of the Emperor himself. On June 25, 1888, William 
II convened a special session of the Reichstag in response not only to his father’s death, but also 
in response to the views of many – especially in England – that he was overtly aggressive and 
sought to launch an aggressive war, a charge which troubled him deeply.21 In his first declaration 
of policy, delivered at this special session of the Reichstag, William II did his best to calm the 
fears of his critics in no uncertain terms. He solemnly swore that “In foreign politics I am 
determined to keep peace with every one [sic] in so far as in me lies. My love for the German 
army and my position in it will never lead me into the temptation of robbing the country of the 
benefits of peace, unless some attack upon the empire, or her allies, forces war upon us.”22 In 
response to those who charged that he would seek a series of military victories of his own in an 
effort to build his own reputation, he responded “Germany needs no new martial glory nor any 
conquest of whatever sort after she has, once and for all, established her right to exist as a single 
and independent nation.”23 The Emperor would go on to make countless similar speeches 
declaring his love of and intent to maintain peace in Europe, though the fears of his critics were 
never wholly silenced.  
                                                
19 “ANSWER TO ADDRESS [June 18.],” Hansard 1803-2005, accessed March 16, 2015, 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1888/aug/09/answer-to-address-june-18#S3V0330P0_18880809_HOL_7.  
20 Ibid. 
21 Christian Gauss, The German Emperor as Shown in His Public Utterances, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1915), 31. This work served as pro-German wartime propaganda in the United States. 
22 Ibid., 37-38. 
23 Ibid., 38. 
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To those who would argue that the emperor’s pledges of peace and friendship, 
particularly towards England, were merely words, Edwin D. Mead, an impartial observer 
responded in The Atlantic Monthly in 1908. He wrote that “this ‘war lord’ throughout his reign… 
has faithfully kept the peace; that while during the last generation England and almost every 
nation in Europe… have been engaged in wars… Germany… has for the whole long period of 
almost forty years kept out of war.”24 Inevitably, views of William II were colored by the 
outbreak of the First World War, but his earlier attempts to maintain the peace in Europe were 
successful. 
Many of William II’s later actions and words were viewed as overtly aggressive, as 
previously mentioned, though they were not issued as threats to any nation, be it England or any 
other power. Rather than war, the sole focus of the emperor’s actions was the improvement and 
expansion of Germany. Kuno Francke, in an article for The Atlantic Monthly, placed the Kaiser’s 
actions into perspective after the First World War broke out in 1914. He wrote that “All his acts 
and utterances have been inspired by the one desire of developing German character to its 
utmost.”25 Francke’s assertion is essentially an echo of a statement made by A. Maurice Low in 
The Atlantic Monthly in 1906; he asserted that William II is dedicated to “the idea of the 
greatness of Germany. To make Germany respected and feared, a voice that shall compel 
obedience and whose frown no nation shall wittingly provoke, and to do this through the force of 
diplomacy and not the force of arms….”26 It is an unfortunate fact, as this paper will explore, that 
in the course of pursuing the most beneficial outcomes for Germany, William II’s policies 
offended and alienated many of his neighbors, particularly Britain, and were seen as direct 
attacks. 
                                                
24 Edwin D. Mead, "England and Germany," The Atlantic Monthly, (March 1908), 398. 
25 Kuno Francke, "The Kaiser and his People," The Atlantic Monthly, (October 1914), 567. 
26 Low, "The German Emperor," 300. 
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Much of the aggression heard in William II’s words was not aggression at all. As Low 
explained in The Atlantic Monthly, “The Emperor is an extemporaneous speaker. It is only on 
rare occasions that he prepares a speech…. [This] has frequently caused him to say more than 
intended and more than was wise,” and that as a result he “is carried away by his own 
enthusiasm….”27 Further, William II was able to accurately gauge his audience, allowing him 
know what they wanted to hear and just how he should say it, resulting in speeches that were on 
similar topics but had completely different tones.28 His speeches were not meant to be picked 
apart and analyzed; they were meant to inspire, to address directly the hearts and minds of his 
immediate audience. Low brings up the example of William II’s “mailed fist” speech of 1897 in 
which the Emperor called on his brother Henry to go to the German possessions in China and 
defend any European that sought protection – not simply Germans – from all threats.29 William 
II declared “But if any one [sic] should undertake to insult us in our rights or to wish to harm us, 
then drive in with the mailed fist and, as God wills, bind about your young brow the laurels 
which no one in the entire German Empire will begrudge you!”30 As Low points out, this speech 
was torn apart by the Emperor’s critics and the foreign press for being boisterous and that the 
emperor was irresponsible, war-mongering, and unfit to rule.31 “[The Emperor] knew that he was 
addressing uneducated men and that it was necessary to stir their emotions,” Low explained.32 
After all, the speech was directed at soldiers and sailors, about to leave their homeland and more 
than likely in need of inspiration. It is perceptions of aggression and counterarguments such as 
                                                
27 Ibid., 305. 
28 Ibid., 304. 
29 Gauss, The German Emperor as Shown in His Public Utterances¸ 116-117. 
30 Ibid., 121. 




these that characterize the criticisms surrounding many of the speeches that William II gave 
throughout his reign, and served to taint perceptions of him in Great Britain. 
William II would again come into the international spotlight and be condemned not even 
two years after his accession to the throne. On March 18, 1890, Chancellor Bismarck of 
Germany resigned his post after splitting with the young emperor. According to William II, the 
rift that grew between himself and Bismarck was over social policy; wishing to be an emperor 
for modern times, William II sought to improve the lot of the working class through the 
expansion of state welfare programs, while Bismarck sought to put down labor unrest with 
force.33 This rift was made worse by William II’s refusal to renew Bismarck’s Reinsurance 
Treaty with Russia and by William II’s desire to rule for himself rather than through Bismarck. 
The split proved irreparable and Bismarck resigned, though in the eyes of the world, William II 
had dismissed him. This brought widespread condemnation from many in the international 
community and criticism from William II’s opponents, both domestic and foreign. 
The criticism resulted from the fact that many in the international community regarded 
Bismarck as the peacekeeper of Europe, the only man keeping the continent from devolving into 
a chaotic war as a result of Germany’s unification and subsequent upset of the balance of power. 
William II’s perceived dismissal of the peacekeeper of Europe signaled to many that he desired a 
war of his own. This view was held by some bodies of the British press. In an article for 
Reynolds’s Newspaper on March 30, 1890, someone under the pen name Gracchus, presumably 
a radical, espoused such a view.34 They wrote “But the resignation of Bismarck is not considered 
any guarantee for the maintenance of peace. Emperor William is longing to obtain a military 
reputation, and, owing to his headstrong and obstinate nature, may strive to pick a quarrel with 
                                                
33 Ex-Kaiser Wilhelm II, My Memoirs: 1878-1918, (London: Impala Press, 2006), 38-39. 




France.”35 This is a mere echoing of British fears from two years before, when William II first 
took the throne. 
Of further concern regarding the resignation of Bismarck were the characters of the two 
men involved. By breaking with Bismarck, it is entirely possible that William II’s critics viewed 
this as his attempt to break with the more traditional German character and forge a new one with 
himself as its personification. When one takes into account the view of many British observers 
that the Emperor was a sabre-rattling war-monger, this feared new character would be one of 
aggressive nationalism and expansion, German assertiveness, complete submission in all aspects 
of life to the emperor, and ultimately war.  
It is interesting to note, however, that one foreign observer held a view counter to those 
who saw Bismarck as Europe’s peacekeeper. Low asserts in The Atlantic Monthly that it is very 
likely that William II’s perceived dismissal of Bismarck was in fact carried out in an attempt to 
avoid another war. He conjectured that William II “was sagacious enough to know that if 
Bismarck remained in power he would again so manipulate affairs as to force Germany into war, 
precisely as he had made the first William take the field against France.”36 This conjecture, 
coupled with William II’s expressed desire to lessen the plight of the working class, should have 
endeared him to some of the British people and earned him their support, though as was to 
become characteristic of his interactions with the island nation, his intentions were 
misunderstood. 
One of William II’s first direct interactions with the English government came in 1890 
with the negotiation of the Heligoland- Zanzibar Treaty. William II sorely wanted control of 
Heligoland, a small island off the cost of Germany which the British possessed. In his memoirs, 
                                                
35 Ibid. 
36 Low, "The German Emperor," 303. 
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William II explains that his primary goal in gaining control of Heligoland was to serve a base for 
the navy he sought to create and to prevent a hostile naval force – either the English themselves 
or one of their allies – from sailing to Germany’s coast unopposed.37 Additionally, because 
Heligoland sat essentially at the mouth of many key German waterways which led to important 
trading ports, to control it was to control German trade.38 
 Lord Salisbury, the British Prime Minister at the time, was willing to trade Heligoland for 
Germany’s promise to abandon its colonial rights to the island of Zanzibar, off the eastern coast 
of Africa.39 This William II found agreeable. He reasoned that once the harbors of Dar es Salaam 
and Tanga in German East Africa – opposite the island of Zanzibar – were made deeper and 
supplied with sufficient cargo loading equipment, they would overtake the archaic ports on 
Zanzibar as the primary shipping centers along the east coast of Africa, thus making the 
forfeiture of German claims to the island inconsequential.40 
 There was a good deal of debate in the Houses of Parliament over the terms of the 
proposed treaty. Dr. Tanner, a member of the Irish Parliamentary Party in the House of 
Commons, was in favor of turning over Heligoland to Germany because it was “useless to 
[England], either for commerce or as a shelter for our vessels of war. I think a great deal might 
be done if this little island were given up to the German Emperor in establishing a modus vivendi 
between the two countries.”41 Other members of Parliament, like Mr. E. Beckett, Conservative 
member of the House of Commons, were hostile to the idea and remained so after the ratification 
of the treaty. On July 24, 1890, Beckett let his distrust of William II’s intentions be known when 
                                                
37 Ex-Kaiser Wilhelm II, My Memoirs, 7. 
38 Ibid., 53. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., 53-54. 





he spat “no one will say that Germany does not get very considerable advantage from 
England…. We have thrown away huge territories in Africa with a reckless prodigality … and in 
our passion for parting we take the Gibraltar of the Baltic and chuck it into the German 
Emperor's lap…”42 Beckett’s description of Heligoland as “the Gibraltar of the Baltic” is a clear 
reference to its strategic value in containing German expansion, particularly of its future navy, 
and of the persistent perception of William II as wanting a war. In this case, it was feared that he 
would use the island as a naval base, both to protect the German coast and to serve as a 
launching point for an attack on Britain.  
Colonel Nolan, a member of the Irish Parliamentary Party in the House of Commons, 
agreed with Beckett on July 25 when he said that “If Heligoland is not in the hands of the 
German Emperor it is possible to blockade the Weser and Elbe, but if Heligoland is in the hands 
of Germany, it will be impossible, even for a great Naval Power, to keep up an efficient 
blockade.”43 It is evident that mistrust of William II persisted and that his attempts to secure for 
Germany a place for a naval base to both protect its coast and serve as a launching point for a 
navy to protect its growing international trade were misinterpreted. They were instead seen by 
many members of Parliament as preparations for a war against England. 
In the end, the treaty was ratified on July 1, 1890, despite heated debate in Parliament. It 
established the boundaries of German East Africa, it compelled Germany to give up its rights to 
the island of Zanzibar and to cease encroachments into British Kenya, and ceded the island of 
Heligoland to Germany.44 William II celebrated this treaty as a peaceful expansion of the 
                                                
42 “SECOND BEADING,” Hansard 1803-2005, accessed March 16, 2015, 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1890/jul/24/second-beading#S3V0347P0_18900724_HOC_174 
43 “SECOND BEADING. [ADJOURNED DEBATE.],” Hansard 1803-2005, accessed March 16, 2015, 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1890/jul/25/second-beading-adjourned-
debate#S3V0347P0_18900725_HOC_187 
44 “Anglo-German Treaty [Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty] (July 1, 1890),” translated by Adam Blauhut, German 
Historical Institute, July 1, 1890, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=1369 
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German Empire and a victory for the German people achieved without bloodshed; he could now 
begin work on a navy to protect German colonies and shipping, as well as fortify Heligoland to 
protect German ports.45 Many in Parliament, and Britain as a whole, saw this as William II 
preparing for war with England and further proof that the Emperor was a war-monger. In a few 
years’ time, England was about to become embroiled in the Second Boer War and William II’s 
actions would again strain the relations between Britain and Germany.  
On December 29, 1895, Dr. Leander Jameson led an armed raid into the Transvaal in 
southern Africa that was supposed to be launched in unison with an uprising in Johannesburg 
with the aim of overthrowing the Boer government and inviting British rule.46 The uprising 
failed to materialize and the Boers, under President Krüger, were able to defeat the raiders, who 
surrendered on January 2, 1896.47 The following day, January 3, William II sent a telegram to 
President Krüger that read simply  
I express my sincere congratulations that you and your people, without appealing to 
friendly powers for help, by dint of your own vigor, have been able to restore the peace 
against the armed hordes that invaded your country as disturbers of the peace, and to 
preserve the independence of the country against outside attacks.48 
 
The firestorm of criticism from Great Britain was swift, and the outcry was vehement. Just as 
William II later claimed he knew it would be. 
 The British press gave voice to the people’s outrage. In one article for The Morning Post, 
an unnamed author blasted William II’s telegram.49 The author regarded it “not [as] a 
                                                
45 Ex-Kaiser Wilhelm II, My Memoirs, 54. 
46 "Jameson Raid," South African History Online, accessed April 13, 2015, 
http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/jameson-raid 
47 Ibid. 
48 “The Krüger Telegram (1896),” translated by Thomas Dunlap, German Historical Institute, January 3, 1896, 
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=754 
49 "The GERMAN EMPEROR'S telegram to President KRUGER, which has so greatly surprised and distressed the 
people of England, must be read in its context.," The Morning Post (London, England), January 4, 1896. 
16 
 
sentimental effusion, but a deliberate political act.”50 They argue that the message must be 
viewed in context: it was issued after the conclusion “of a meeting at which the Emperor 
conferred with the Imperial Chancellor, the Foreign Secretary, the Admiral commanding the 
German Navy, the Administrator of the Navy, and the Head of the Naval Cabinet.”51 This 
therefore meant that William II might be seeking to declare war on England and was “preparing 
to concentrate the German Navy against the nearest British squadron,” though the author admits 
that “Nothing is more unlikely than that Germany single-handed should seek a quarrel with Great 
Britain.”52 This concession, however, was followed up by the conjecture that Germany would 
ally itself with the French before attacking England.53 
 In Parliament, condemnation of William II’s actions was widespread, and once more 
fears of his aggression were voiced. Mr. Darling, a Conservative member of the House of 
Commons, espoused these beliefs. He said of the incident “The German Emperor's telegram was 
not so much an impulsive expression of the German Emperor's feelings, as an indication of the 
hope that at last the well-matured plan of von Weber was within a measurable distance of 
realisation.”54 The “plan of von Weber” to which Mr. Darling refers is an article released in 1879 
by Ernst von Weber in Berlin, which argued strongly for the German colonization of South 
Africa with the purpose of establishing a wealthy colonial empire to rival British India.55 Once 
again, the actions of William II were viewed as an attack on English interests and seen as a 
signal of the emperor’s desire to go to war to spread German influence. What’s more, William II 
later claimed in his memoirs, “I received from all circles of English society, especially from 





54 “CIVIL SERVICE AND REVENUE DEPARTMENTS ESTIMATES, 1896–7.,” Hansard 1803-2005, accessed 





aristocratic ladies unknown to me, a veritable flood of letters containing every possible kind of 
reproach; some of the writers did not hesitate even at slandering me personally and insulting 
me.”56 He was beset by criticism not simply from the English government and the English press, 
which were often less than friendly towards him, but now he was also supposedly subjected to 
criticism directly from the English public. 
 According to William II, however, his interest did not lie in the colonization of South 
Africa, nor did it lie in sparking a war with England. He himself did not even write the telegram, 
and claimed that he did not want to send it for he knew that the moment he did England would be 
in an uproar and he would be personally blamed.57 His ministers and the Imperial Chancellor, 
which The Morning Post accurately reported that he met with, though on a topic unrelated to the 
Jameson Raid, appealed to his desire to please the German people. It was argued to William II 
that the German people felt a sense of kinship towards the Boers – a people of Dutch descent and 
thus considered to be racially related the Germans – and that they were outraged by the Jameson 
Raid.58 He was informed that as a constitutional monarch, it would not behove him to stand 
against the will of his people or the advice of his constitutional advisers, who encouraged the 
outward expression of the German people’s sentiments through the issuing of a telegram.59 
William II grudgingly consented to the sending of the telegram and signed it on assurances from 
one of his advisers, Herr von Marschall, that he would publicly assume responsibility for the 
telegram so that the Emperor would not be blamed.60 Herr von Marschall reported his 
responsibility for the telegram to the Times correspondent in Berlin, but it made little difference; 
the British public held William II personally responsible and condemned him, just as he 
                                                
56 Ex-Kaiser Wilhelm II, My Memoirs, 83. 
57 Ibid., 80-81. 
58 Ibid., 80. 
59 Ibid., 81. 
60 Ibid., 81-82. 
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predicted they would.61 Once more, William II’s attempt to appease his people were resultantly 
misunderstood and drew the ire of the vast majority of British society. 
What would prove to be one of the longest-running and most toxic aspects of William 
II’s relationship with Great Britain was the German Navy. A powerful navy was something that 
William II long felt Germany was in dire need of, for according to him, the existing ships in 
Germany were “little better than old iron,” and were “slowly dying of old age… [Among them] 
were almost the oldest ships still in service in Europe.”62 This need was tied into Germany’s 
expansion in the realm of colonies, namely in Africa, China, and the Pacific. William II had long 
sought Germany colonial possessions, not simply for the prestige, but for the raw materials they 
could provide for the Fatherland.63 Once they had been acquired, likeminded capitalists sought to 
economically develop them and began a lively international trade.64 Because of the vulnerability 
of German shipping and its far-flung colonial possessions, William II had insisted on the creation 
of a German navy for the protection of the empire. According to the Emperor, vital to the idea of 
this protective navy was “the ‘idea of risk’.”65 By this he meant that it was necessary to create a 
navy so strong as “to cause even the strongest hostile fleet to think seriously before it came to 
blows with the German fleet, in view of the heavy losses that were to be feared in a battle, losses 
which might place the foe in danger of becoming too weak for other tasks.”66 With the 
appointment of Admiral von Tirpitz in 1897 – who held the same views as William II in regards 
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to the navy – to the position of Secretary of the Navy, work began in earnest on the passage of a 
Naval Law that would bring about the creation of this new and desperately needed fleet.67 
The Reichstag, however, had long resisted any measure proposed to create a new German 
fleet.68 The Emperor and Admiral von Tirpitz knew that the old methods of attempting to 
convince the Reichstag of the need for a fleet would fail, therefore they instead employed a new 
strategy: to educate the members of the Reichstag on the need for a navy and to force their hand 
with public opinion.69 To this end, William II wrote in his memoirs, “an energetic propaganda 
was necessary, through a well-organized and well-directed Press, as well as through eminent 
men of science at the universities and technical schools.”70 Their strategy was successful, but 
according to the Emperor, what really convinced the Reichstag was the English themselves who, 
during the Boer War, seized two neutral German steamers off the east coast of Africa.71  
As a result of William II’s efforts – and the proving of his arguments by the English – the 
Reichstag passed the First Fleet Act in 1898.72 It provided for “an active navy consisting of 1 
flagship, 16 battleships, 8 armoured coastal ships, and a force of 9 large and 26 small cruisers to 
be ready by 1904.”73 A second more ambitious Fleet Act was introduced in 1900, which called 
“for an active navy of 2 flagships, 36 battleships, 11 large cruisers, and 34 small cruisers” by 
1917.74 Subsequent amendments to these laws would call for an increase in fleet size, the 
introduction of the Dreadnought class of ships, and a decrease in the length of time ships would 
serve for before being replaced. 
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These Acts and their subsequent amendments, passed with the intent of providing 
security for Germany’s colonies, trade, and home ports, were viewed quite differently in Great 
Britain, however. In Parliament the reactions of many were heated and suspicious. Lt.-Colonel 
George Kemp, a Liberal Unionist member of the House of Commons, said of the German navy 
in 1903 “However genuine and sincere the friendship of the German Emperor might be for 
England, it was well known that the predominant feeling of the German people, combined with 
the increase in the naval power of that Empire, must be fraught with danger to this country…”75 
In 1911, Mr. Rowland Hunt, also a Liberal Unionist in the House of Commons, cited Herr Bebel, 
the leader of the German Social Democrats – domestic opponents of the Emperor – saying “Herr 
Bebel, said … the increase of the German Navy was directed wholly and solely against Great 
Britain, and that all the other reasons for it were humbug.”76 Hunt then warned “The German 
Emperor said that the future of Germany was on the water. These are the dangers that lie in front 
of us. The fate of France and the record of Germany ought to be sufficient warning.”77 The very 
next week, Hunt, asked “On the two occasions when the [British] Government reduced their 
shipbuilding programme Germany at once increased hers. Does that look like peaceful 
intentions?”78 If such utterances are any indication, then the erroneous view of William II as 
seeking war with England persisted in Parliament, despite the Emperor’s continued declarations 
of friendship to the island nation and his public statements of the purely protective purposes of 
his navy. 
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Similarly distrustful views of William II’s creation and build-up of his navy were found 
in the British press as well. One particularly effective political cartoon on the issue was drawn by 
Bernard Partridge for the August 15, 1906 edition of Punch magazine titled “An Under-rated 
Monster.”79 In it, a woman representing Britain stands on the shore, gazing out to sea and calling 
to Lord Tweedmouth – First Lord of the Admiralty – in a rowboat labelled “Admiralty.”80 
Looming farther out at sea is a horrifying sea-serpent with the head of William II, made of guns, 
masts, rigging, and smoke-stacks.81 The woman remarks that the serpent looks rather nasty, to 
which Tweedmouth replies that the beast is no threat.82 This piece is included on the following 
page. The cartoon in fact attacks both Britain and Germany. William II and his navy are vilified 
and depicted as something to be feared, a menace to England. But it also levels criticism at the 
Liberal Lord Tweedmouth for not doing enough to address the German navy. Cartoons such as 
these perpetuated the erroneous view of the Emperor as a war-monger and threat to England 
among the English populace in direct opposition to his expressions of peaceful intent. 
 The growing fear in Parliament of the threat of William II, exacerbated by his 
expansionist naval program, led Britain to seek some way to counteract the growing might of 
                                                









Germany. To do this, they sought an alliance with a most unlikely partner: France. Britain had 
for centuries been at odds with their neighbour across the Channel, but the French had long felt 
threatened by William II and the growing might of his nation, which resulted in their entrance 
into the Franco-Russian Alliance Military Convention on August 18, 1892.83 So it was that on 
April 8, 1904, England and France signed the Entente Cordiale.84 The document guaranteed 
England freedom of action in Egypt and France freedom of action in Morocco, firmly established 
colonial boundaries in Africa, and outlined the borders of each nation’s zones of influence in 
Siam.85 Sydney Brooks, an observer in The Atlantic Monthly wrote in 1910 of the German 
reaction to this agreement.86 The people of Germany, he wrote “[accused] the British… of giving 
anti-German point to their diplomacy,… and of organizing a league of powers with the object of 
penning Germany in.”87 Additionally, Low points out in The Atlantic Monthly that Germany 
“was moved to protest [the Entente Cordiale] by two considerations. She objects because it does 
not accord with her dignity to be treated as a negligible quantity in the politics of Europe; and 
because if England is to make her profit out of Egypt, and France her profit out of Morocco, 
Germany also must make her profit somewhere.”88 William II himself viewed the Entente 
Cordiale as an extension of what he perceived to be his uncle King Edward VII’s “policy of 
encirclement” and felt the agreement “was for the world, especially for Germany, an unpleasant 
novelty…”89 So great was the mistrust of the German Emperor and so badly misinterpreted were 
his intentions by the British they were driven to ally themselves with their ancestral foe. This, in 
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turn, shocked and hurt William II, whose intentions were peaceful and sought no wars with 
either power. However, in short order William II was to end up testing the strength of this new 
agreement in Morocco, which France now had a free hand in. 
 Towards the end of March in 1905, William II was planning to embark on his yearly 
cruise of the Mediterranean taken for the purposes of his health.90 This became known to the 
Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow, who suggested to William II that he stop at the royal court at 
Lisbon on the way – to which the Emperor assented – as well as to stop at Tangier, Morocco, so 
as to strengthen the position of the Sultan against the French.91 This, William II later claimed, he 
immediately refused to do given the “Morocco question was too full of explosive matter,” and he 
“feared that this visit, in view of the situation in Paris, might be construed as a provocation and 
give rise to an inclination in London to support France in case of war.”92 Bülow, however, in an 
exchange of telegrams with William II while he was in Lisbon, argued that he must visit Tangier 
because the members of the Reichstag and the German public had become interested in the visit 
and desired it to take place.93 Because his people called for it and, as reasoning previously 
employed to convince the Emperor to send the Krüger Telegram stated, it was his duty to 
represent the will of his people, William II grudgingly agreed to pay the Sultan a visit. 
 In Tangier, according to an article titled “Kaiser in Morocco” in the Manchester Courier 
and Lancashire General Advertiser, the Emperor was met warmly by the Sultan’s uncle, the 
native population, European expatriates, and the political delegations of the various European 
nations with interests in Morocco.94 This was also reflected in the report of Councilor von 
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Schoen, Envoy in the Imperial Suite, to the German Foreign Office shortly after the visit ended. 
Schoen went further, saying that William II’s words were all colorless and neutral with the 
exception of a few utterances.95 He reports that, in response to the French agent Count 
Cherisey’s remark that the French Foreign Minister Declasse sent his regards, “the Kaiser replied 
that his visit meant that His Majesty wanted free trade for Germany and complete equality of 
rights with other countries,” which was followed shortly after with the declaration that “he would 
like to treat directly with the Sultan, the free ruler of an independent country, as an equal; that he 
himself would be able to make his just claims valid, and that he expected that these claims would 
also be recognized by France.”96 To the uncle of the Sultan, Schoen writes William II echoed the 
statements he made to Count Cherisey, saying that he “looked upon the Sultan as the ruler of a 
free and independent empire subject to no foreign control; that he expected Germany to have 
advantages equal to those of other countries in trade and commerce; and that he himself would 
always negotiate directly with the Sultan.”97 In response, the Sultan sent a message to William II 
before his departure stating that he would enact no reforms without first consulting the German 
government, something that pleased the Emperor greatly.98 
 The Emperor’s visit, just as he predicted, caused a great deal of uproar in both France and 
England. In his memoirs William II writes that his visit drove Declasse to try to rouse the French 
nation to war against Germany, failing only because the French Minsters of War and of the Navy 
argued that they were not ready for it.99 Declasse even informed the editor of Le Gaulois that 
England pledged to back France in the war he sought, and later reported to the Matin that the 
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British government had pledged to land 100,000 men in Holstein and to seize the Kaiser 
Wilhelm Canal.100 Many members of the English populace, according to Mead in The Atlantic 
Monthly, viewed his visit as further evidence of the Emperor desiring a war with England and 
were hostile to “his ‘butting in’ in Morocco.”101 This pledge from England that they would side 
with France in war was feared and foreseen by William II before he had even left for Lisbon. 
 However, it was his duty as a constitutional monarch to go to Tangier, he felt, because his 
people had called on him through the government to make the trip and to secure for their country 
favorable trade relations with the small African nation. This William II accomplished, which in 
that regard made his visit a success. Additionally, Low points out in The Atlantic Monthly that 
“as a practical result of this policy [and the visit to Tangier] Germany has forced France directly, 
and England indirectly, to recognize the right of Germany to question an agreement made 
without her consent.”102 In this regard, too, William II’s visit can be regarded as a success. But 
by folding to the will of his government officials and asserting Germany’s rights by visiting 
Morocco, he drew the ire of many in England who viewed it as just another instance of him 
trying to foment a war; in this sense it was a dismal failure and brought the world one step closer 
to the First World War. 
 The Moroccan Crisis led directly to the Algeciras Conference being held from January 16 
to April 7, 1906.103 William II, in an attempt to alleviate the tension his visit had caused, called 
on U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt to bring about an international conference in Spain to act 
as an open forum for the determination of Morocco’s status.104 This Conference, with 
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representatives from the European powers and United States, met with the goal of discussing and 
clarifying the relationship between the French government and the nation of Morocco.105 Much 
to the shock of William II, only Austria-Hungary supported Germany’s positions during the 
debates; Italy, Russia, Great Britain, and the United States sided with the French.106 Regardless, 
an agreement was reached and signed on April 7, which “reaffirmed the independence of the 
sultan and the economic equality of the powers, and it provided that French and Spanish police 
officers be under a Swiss inspector general.”107 Mead remarks in The Atlantic Monthly that the 
most significant aspect of the Conference was that it “marked an epoch in international 
procedure, forcing the nations henceforth to concerted action in situations like that in Morocco, 
instead of leaving greedy nations each to its individual pleasure,” and that “this was due to the 
German Emperor, even conceding that he… was actuated by thoughts of future trade.”108 As a 
result of this Conference, William II, who had intended to maintain peace after asserting the 
rights of his nation, inadvertently changed international policy, reinforced the Entente Cordiale, 
and perhaps most significantly, brought together England and Russia. 
 In 1907, both concerned by German naval expansion and brought together by the 
Algeciras Conference and their mutual friend France, Great Britain and Russia entered into an 
Entente of their own.109 Much like the Entente Cordiale, this agreement settled long-running 
territorial and influential disputes and signaled an end to hostilities between the two nations. In 
short, it “settled their colonial disputes in Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet. It delineated spheres of 
influence in Persia, stipulated that neither country would interfere in Tibet’s internal affairs, and 
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recognized Britain’s influence over Afghanistan.”110 It also had the added effect of creating the 
Triple Entente, the coalition of France, Britain, and Russia that would later oppose William II 
and his ally Austria-Hungary in the First World War. Through British misinterpretation of his 
attempts to protect Germany’s economic interests with a navy and attempts to assert the rights of 
his nation abroad, William II unintentionally brought about the completion of what he perceived 
to be Britain’s policy of the encirclement of Germany. William II would once more be at odds 
with Britain over the naval issue the very next year.  
On February 18, 1908, Lord Tweedmouth, First Lord of the Admiralty, received a letter 
from the Emperor himself.111 Tweedmouth reported to Parliament on March 9 that this letter 
“came to me by way of the ordinary post. The letter was a private and a personal one. It was very 
friendly in its tone and quite informal. When I received that letter I showed it to Sir Edward 
Grey. He agreed with me that it should be treated as a private letter and not as an official one.”112 
He went on to say that he replied to William II on February 20 in a similarly friendly and 
informal fashion.113 Tweedmouth was driven to inform Parliament of this because of the outcry 
that had erupted in the British press regarding the letter. One Colonel Repington, the military 
correspondent for the Times, had caught wind of the letters exchanged between Tweedmouth and 
William II, and published an article on the matter on March 6.114 This article unleashed a 
firestorm of criticism from the British public aimed at not just William II for his perceived 
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attempts to influence the British naval funding estimates, but also against Tweedmouth for being 
perceived as vulnerable to such influence and for carrying on this correspondence. 
 Earl Rosebery, a Liberal member of the House of Lords, highlighted the fears of the 
public after listening to Tweedmouth’s explanation. Of the matter he said  
Out of this we have seen a whole world of absolutely insane inferences drawn—that the 
German Emperor was attempting to influence my noble friend, with a view to cutting 
down the Navy Estimates, to check the progression of our armaments, to neutralise the 
defensive activities of our nation, and in some subterranean manner to subvert the whole 
Constitution of the British Government.115 
 
He further remarked that people who make such claims give the British government, and 
William II, far too little credit.116 In his mind, he was “quite sure that it never would have entered 
[William II’s] head, or the head of any educated person outside of a lunatic asylum in Germany, 
that by a private communication to my noble friend he could exercise any influence whatever on 
the progress of British armaments.”117 Earl Rosebery’s calls for reason went largely unheeded, 
however, and the firestorm continued. 
 It was not until after the outbreak of the First World War that the text of William II’s 
letter was released in an article on October 30, 1914 in the British newspaper the Daily Mail.118 
As Tweedmouth claimed and Rosebery argued, it was friendly and made no attempt to influence 
British policy. In it, William II expresses that he believes it is Britain’s right to have a navy 
larger than any other given the size of its empire, and assures Tweedmouth that the British navy 
in no way influenced or continues to influence Germany’s Naval Bill.119 He casually remarks 
that “people would be very thankful over here if at last Germany was left out of [your naval] 
discussion. For it is very galling to the Germans to see their country continually held up as the 
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sole danger and menace to Britain by the whole press…”120 William II, in closing, reemphasizes 
the peaceful intent of his own navy. He writes “Once more. The German Naval Bill is not aimed 
at England, and is not a ‘challenge to British Supremacy of the Sea,’ which will remain 
unchallenged for generations to come.”121 Not only did William II espouse the peaceful intent of 
his navy and liken it in its protective nature to that of England’s, but he concedes England’s right 
to build a navy as large as it wishes and that the idea that any navy would seek to upset 
England’s maritime dominance is ludicrous. In no way does he attempt to influence Tweedmouth 
or British naval policy, instead revealing himself to be a supporter of the English navy by saying 
his words are written “by one who is an ardent admirer of your splendid Navy, who wishes it all 
success, and who hopes that its ensign may ever wave on the same side as the German 
Navy’s…”122 This final revelation of the text of the letter proves that William II had no 
malicious intent in reaching out to Tweedmouth, as was perceived by many in the British press, 
public, and Parliament. Rather, it displays that William II admired the English Navy, desired the 
friendship of the English people, and sought to calm the fears held of the German navy. The air 
of distrust in England led to the drastic misinterpretation of William II’s intent and led to a 
further souring of his relations with Britain. This latest outcry in response to his actions was 
particularly frustrating to William II, and led him to try and address the people of England 
directly in the next few months, with disastrous results. 
 On October 28, 1908, the Daily Telegraph released an interview between the German 
Emperor and an unidentified author. In his memoirs, William II asserts that “[the interview’s] 
object was the improvement of German English relations.”123 There was, however, a terrible 
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divergence between the Emperor’s intent and the perceptions of the British, as had become 
almost customary. In the interview, William II proclaims 
You English… are mad, mad, mad as March hares. What has come over you that you are 
so completely given over to suspicions quite unworthy of a great nation? What more can 
I do than I have done? I declared with all the emphasis at my command, in my speech at 
Guildhall, that my heart is set upon peace, and that it is one of my dearest wishes to live 
on the best of terms with England. Have I ever been false to my word?124 
 
This section of the interview – its opening, in fact – is accurate; the Emperor, as argued earlier, 
had spoken regularly and forcefully of his desire for peace and his actions reflect that desire. His 
tone, however, oscillates dangerously between expressing aggravation and being condescending. 
It is maintained throughout the entirety of the interview. 
 William II goes on to reiterate that he has always been a friend to England, but he 
bemoans that his “task is not of the [sic] easiest. The prevailing sentiment among large sections 
of the middle and lower classes of my own people is not friendly to England. I am, therefore so 
to speak, in a minority in my own land, but it is a minority of the best elements…”125 Meant to 
display to the British populace that his dedication to amicable relations with England is real, such 
a statement instead comes off as declaring that the majority of his own people are hostile to 
Britain, which would undoubtedly alarm readers of the interview. 
 The Emperor goes on to list his acts of friendship towards England, namely his refusal to 
meet with the delegation from the Transvaal during the Boer War, his refusal of the secret calls 
of France and Russia to join them in an attack on Britain while she was engaged in the Boer War, 
and his subsequent report of the incident to Queen Victoria.126 He then goes on to inform the 
interviewer that, at the height of the Boer War, he assessed the positions and strength of both 
                                                






combatants and was personally involved in the creation of a battle plan to ensure a swift English 
victory; this he sent to his grandmother.127 The Emperor then points out that “the plan which I 
formulated ran very much on the same lines as that which was actually adopted by Lord Roberts, 
and carried by him into successful operation.”128 William II ends the interview by declaring, yet 
again, that the purpose of the German navy is not to challenge Britain, but to protect Germany’s 
growing empire.129 It is worth noting that John C. G. Röhl confirms the existence of William II’s 
battle plan in his book Wilhelm II: Into the Abyss of War and Exile, 1900-1941, though asserts 
that it in fact arrived too late for it to have been employed by the British against the Boers; that 
Lord Roberts pursued a similar strategy to victory was merely a coincidence.130 
 The Emperor then sent the interview to Chancellor Bülow for approval, with marginal 
notes explaining what he thought it might be best to eliminate.131 Unfortunately for William II, 
Bülow never had the chance to review the transcript and, through a series of errors, no 
eliminations were made; the interview was approved of as it was and released.132 The firestorm 
of criticism that broke out, both in England and in Germany, over the Emperor’s words was 
immediate. In Germany, Bülow disavowed the Emperor’s actions instead of defending him 
before the Reichstag and lectured William II on his mistakes.133 The British response was far 
more critical. In Parliament, debates became quite heated. Of particular concern was the battle 
plan the German Emperor reportedly submitted to his grandmother. Mr. Haldane, a Liberal 
Imperialist and the Secretary of State for War at the time, declared that his office had no such 
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document in its possession and would make no inquiry to any other department as to whether or 
not it existed.134 In response, Mr. William Redmond, an Irish Parliamentary Party member of the 
House of Commons, spat “Can the right hon. Gentleman state whether there is such a document 
in existence within his knowledge; in view of what has occurred, will he suggest to the Prime 
Minister that it would be easier, and, indeed, more regular, to offer the Kaiser a seat in the 
Cabinet?”135 Following this scathing question, a tumult erupted in the House, prompting the 
Speaker to call for order.136 
 The British press was no friendlier to the Emperor’s interview, and articles about it 
became as heated as the aforementioned confrontation in Parliament. One comparatively tame 
article in The Western Times entitled “The Kaiser’s Miscalculation,” explains the failure of the 
Emperor’s interview to improve relations.137 The unnamed author gives “the Kaiser credit for 
good intentions, and will not question his sincerity of purpose. But it is pretty evident that his 
purpose will miscarry.”138 They charge that the Emperor has perhaps forgotten the events 
surrounding the coalition of nations that formed against England during the Boer War, and 
asserts that if the Emperor sought to sour relations between the Triple Entente, then he failed 
because it was no secret that France bore England ill will at the time, and to learn that their 
opinion was more hostile than previously thought matters little.139 The author further denounces 
the interview as “a rash and inconsiderate act, which will exercise an adverse influence, it may 
be, upon German diplomacy for years to come.”140 
                                                











 Rather than improve relations with Britain, as William II hoped to do, he instead drew the 
ire of both his countrymen and the British. The condescending tone of his words and the 
unbridled frustration in them obscured their message. Given this truth, it was impossible for his 
words to have been interpreted by the English the way he intended them to be. In one fell swoop 
he made himself appear unstable and unfriendly, and in so doing increased the fear in England of 
himself, his nation, and his navy, and no doubt strengthened the bonds of the Triple Entente. And 
in another three years, William II would conduct himself in such a way as to do the same thing 
once again. 
 In 1911, Morocco was once more at the center of international attention. The Algeciras 
Act of 1906 had guaranteed the sovereignty of the Sultan. Further, a later Franco-German 
Agreement, reached in 1909, guaranteed the economic equality of all nations in Morocco.141 The 
French, in violation of both agreements, forced the Sultan to accept a loan that for all intents and 
purposes brought him under their control and ended his sovereignty.142 This led to great 
resentment of both the Sultan and the French by the Moroccan people who, after the execution of 
Moroccan soldiers by a French officer for desertion, revolted in Fez, then the nation’s capital 
city.143 The French declared that they would occupy Fez and other Moroccan cities in an effort to 
save European lives and preserve the sovereignty of the Sultan.144 Their occupation of Fez began 
on May 21, 1911.145 
Before his government took any action, William II – who was on a state visit to England 
at that time – claimed that he was asked by Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg to determine how the 
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British viewed the situation.146 The Emperor ascertained that his cousin, King George V, 
believed that in light of France’s actions the Algeciras Act was no longer in effect, but given that 
Britain had conducted similar actions in Egypt previously, it would do nothing to obstruct 
France’s seizure of Morocco.147 George V frankly recommended that William II and his 
government begin working out commercial protection agreements for their interests in Morocco 
with the French government.148 After the Emperor returned to Germany, he was informed by his 
Foreign Office that they intended to send the gunship the Panther to the port of Agadir, 
Morocco.149 William II wrote later that he was at first strongly opposed to the idea and expressed 
this to the members of his Foreign Office.150 This, one can surmise, was because William II 
feared the undoubtedly inflammatory effect such an act would have on relations not just with 
France, but also with her ally Britain. However, when it was revealed to him that German firms 
had petitioned the Foreign Office for protection for themselves and their interests in Morocco, 
the Emperor quickly agreed to the sending of the Panther.151 On July 1, the Panther steamed into 
the port of Agadir and the German government announced that it did so at the request of German 
citizens for protection.152 
Given that the Algeciras Act and Franco-German agreement were both seen as defunct, 
William II and his government sought compensation from the French for their loss of influence 
in Morocco. Fritz Fischer, in his book War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914, 
reports that the decision to send the Panther was met with great enthusiasm throughout 
                                                
146 Ex-Kaiser Wilhelm II, My Memoirs, 141. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid., 142. 
150 Ibid. 




Germany, with the exception of the Social Democrats.153 The German people then began to 
demand of their government and Emperor that the German nation receive some sort of territorial 
compensation, so on July 15 the German Secretary of State Kiderlen demanded that France 
concede the entirety of the French Congo to Germany.154 This demand was flatly rejected by the 
French Prime Minister on July 17.155 William II, however, was unable to support Kiderlen’s 
demand because he feared the intervention of the British into negotiations were such a large 
piece of territory to be the prize.156 As was often the case where the British were involved, the 
Emperor’s worst fears came to pass. 
The act of sending the Panther to Agadir, though it was taken to defend German lives 
and property, and subsequent negotiations with France unsurprisingly caused an uproar in 
Britain. This uproar was not simply a result of the extant fear of Germany’s navy or its Emperor, 
but – at least for the government – it was also because they were not officially consulted in the 
negotiations. William II and Bethmann-Hollweg had mistakenly inferred that King George V’s 
view on the situation represented the opinion of the Parliament.157 The arrival of the Panther and 
Franco-German negotiations prompted David Lloyd-George, then British Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, to use his speech at Mansion House on July 22 to address the matter, though he did 
not refer to Germany by name. Lloyd-George warned that  
if a situation were to be forced upon us in which peace could only be preserved by… 
allowing Britain to be treated where her interests were vitally affected as if she were of 
no account in the Cabinet of nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price 
would be a humiliation in tolerable [sic] for a great country like ours to endure.158 
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This warning amounted to a thinly veiled threat of the use of force on the part of Britain, if need 
be. Much to the outrage of the German people, the Emperor and Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg 
backed down, though Kiderlen did not.159 William II called for a moderation of German 
demands.160 Fischer writes that “Wilhelm II did not want a war, he only wanted to see the 
negotiations speeded up and brought with determination to a conclusion.”161 Though it was not 
speedy, a conclusion was finally reached thanks to William II’s calls for Kiderlen to moderate 
demands.  
The British press, unsurprisingly, was entirely skeptical of William II and his 
government’s assurances that the intent behind the sending of the Panther and demanding 
compensation were peaceful. Indeed, many viewed such claims with cynicism and answered 
them with mockery. A prime example of this is a political cartoon by Leonard Raven Hill titled 
“Misunderstood” for the September 6, 1911, issue of Punch magazine.162 Standing in a field, 
weeping and rubbing his eyes is the personification of Germany dressed as William II.163 He 
bemoans the fact that he has been misunderstood and weeps “Nobody loves me – and they all 
want to trample on me!”164 Again, though this is does not depict the Emperor himself, the 
cartoon speaks to the central theme of William II’s relations with England – and indeed the 
central theme of this paper: that his intentions were time and again misunderstood by the 
English, leading to almost perpetually frigid relations despite William II’s best efforts, and 
eventually to the outbreak of the First World War. The cartoon described is presented on the 
following page. 
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On November 4, 1911, an agreement was finally reached between the governments of 
France and Germany.165 Germany agreed to allow and recognize the protectorate which France 
planned to establish over Morocco and ceded to France a small tract of useless land from their 
Cameroon territory.166 In return, Germany was to receive more than 100,000 square miles of 
territory from the French Congo, which gave Germany two river outlets to the Congo along 
which they could ship their goods from Cameroon.167 
Though Emperor William II, attempting to maintain the peace, was responsible for the 
moderation of his government’s demands, which in turn led to an end of the crisis, he was still 
condemned by the British and the French, as well as by his own people. The Entente Cordiale 
viewed the Emperor’s approval of the deployment of the Panther – though he permitted it solely 
to protect German interests from those revolting in Morocco – as an aggressive act meant to 
provoke an armed conflict, as he no doubt feared they would. This garnered William II threats 
from David Lloyd-George, further soured his relations with Great Britain, and brought England 
and France even closer together. Despite the relations between the Emperor and Great Britain 
  
                                                








taking another blow as a result of the Agadir Incident, the very next year William II was met 
with opportunity to achieve an amicable agreement with England. 
On January 29, 1912, William II welcomed to court a representative from the English 
government – without the knowledge of the English ambassador – named Sir Ernest Cassel.168 
Cassel had brought with him a note written with the approval and knowledge of the British 
government that extended an offer of British neutrality in the event Germany was to go to war, in 
exchange for limiting the German naval program, which was shortly to be expanded with a new 
Naval Law.169 William II, overjoyed and amazed by the sudden prospect of an agreement with 
England, summoned at once Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, who was equally astonished.170 
Admiral von Tirpitz was also summoned, and it was decided that the Emperor should respond 
favorably to these negotiations in English personally as he had the greatest mastery of the 
language among the men present and it was desired that their response not be misunderstood if 
translated from German.171 After several hours of painstaking revision, the affirmative note was 
produced and handed to Sir Cassel, who replied when asked the name of the person who would 
be negotiating the decision, admitted he was unsure at that time.172 Sir Cassel returned to Britain 
that same day and William II and Admiral von Tirpitz began to gather the proper materials on 
their proposed Naval Law so as to prepared for negotiations.173 The Emperor’s excitement at 
finally having the opportunity to reach an agreement with England – one which they in fact 
initiated – is understandable, given his repeated professions of his desire for peace and to live on 
good terms with his island neighbor. His surprise is equally understandable, given the hostile 
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perceptions and criticisms from many in Britain of William II personally as well as of his 
government, especially of late. It is quite telling that William II was immediately willing to 
negotiate a limitation to his beloved Naval Bill in an effort to reach said agreement. Röhl 
confirms that such a meeting took place in his book Wilhelm II: Into the Abyss of War and Exile, 
1900-1941, but his telling of events understandably lacks the depth that William II’s account 
does.174 
It was soon determined that Minister of War Richard Haldane would be sent to negotiate, 
and William II and Tirpitz speculated that this was due to his background as a lawyer and his 
familiarity with German philosophy and the German language, though the Emperor writes in his 
memoirs that he thought it was strange for the British not to send their Naval Minister.175 
William II later claimed this decision was primarily political: Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey 
had simply not wanted Naval Minister Winston Churchill to receive the credit and glory for an 
agreement.176 Haldane came prepared when he arrived on February 8 with directions from Grey, 
Churchill, and Lloyd-George, issued on January 29, which laid out the three goals of his 
mission.177 The first, and most fundamental, was that British naval dominance was to be 
recognized and accepted by Germany, and that to ensure this German naval expansion had to be 
curtailed.178 The second was to make clear that England had no desire to restrict German colonial 
expansion and to express the desire for an understanding as to how England could assist that 
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expansion.179 The third was to propose reciprocal agreements for remaining neutral during an 
armed conflict the other nation was involved in.180 
William II in his memoirs reported that over the several days Haldane was present he 
proved to be an able, knowledgeable, and reasonable diplomat, which resulted in an agreement 
acceptable to both which limited German naval expansion and guaranteed neutrality.181 Haldane 
returned to England pleased, promising that a written first draft of an agreement was to be 
prepared and delivered by his government in a week or two.182 No agreement arrived, however, 
as the date for the introduction of the Naval Law drew near; instead William II received further 
questions and requests for naval data.183 These questions and requests came as the British 
government continued to closely examine the German Naval Bill and found further issues with it 
beyond simply its increase in the size of the navy.184 In his memoirs the Emperor writes “Little 
by little the suspicion grew in me that the English were not earnest with regard to the agreement, 
for question followed question and details, which had nothing to do with the agreement, were 
sought.”185 Given the momentous nature of the projected agreement, William II’s anxiety was 
certainly understandable, if a little exaggerated.186  
Fischer writes that “Four weeks after Haldane’s visit the fiasco was so plain for all to see 
that the tension in Berlin became unbearable and led to a government crisis.”187 This delay 
resulted in calls from within the German government for William II to drop the Naval Bill to 
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appease England and bring about an agreement.188 But to do that, reasoned the Emperor, was to 
allow a foreign power to influence matters of German national defense, violating his nation’s 
right to self-determination.189 It is deeply ironic that William II was faced with England 
attempting to influence a Naval Bill so shortly after he himself was falsely accused by the British 
of doing the same to British naval estimates. This was something that, as a constitutional ruler, 
he felt he could not do. William II later wrote that he asked his friend, the President of the 
Hamburg Senate, Dr. Burchard, for his objective opinion given that he was not subjected to the 
fierce party debates in the Reichstag which had erupted over whether or not to introduce the 
law.190 Dr. Burchard reportedly advised that William II introduce the law as it was his duty to his 
people and to his Fatherland to do so, and that it was just as much his duty not to allow a foreign 
power to influence German self-determination.191 
William II learned that fierce debate had erupted in England over the agreement, and that 
Haldane was criticized for allowing Tirpitz to “cheat” him, which led the Emperor to suspect that 
Haldane’s instructions were to “cheat” Tirpitz.192 In the end, the British government informed 
Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg that they disavowed Cassel’s note and the agreement reached 
with Haldane, withdrew their offer of neutrality, and recommended that William II fire 
Bethmann-Hollweg.193 To both maintain his honor and perform his constitutional duty, William 
II claimed later that he introduced the Naval Bill in March with the limitations agreed upon with 
Haldane intact, while England continued its own naval program without change.194 This, one can 
surmise, would have again led to declarations and accusations both in the British press and 
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Parliament that William II was a war-monger and was preparing to attack England, as all 
previous Naval Bills had. 
This entire episode is telling. William II, finally granted the opportunity to achieve peace 
and amicable relations with England, was, by his own account and according to Fischer, willing 
to scale down the expansion of his navy.195 The navy which he helped create, which he helped 
expand, and which he deemed vital to the expansion of German colonial ambitions and defense 
of both his people’s trade and lives, was to be reduced to maintain peace with Britain. When it 
became clear that the agreement that was reached with Haldane would not be honored, William 
II reported later that he introduced the Naval Bill with the limitations in the now disavowed 
agreement and it was passed. In this way, William II had hoped to show the British that he was a 
man of honor, a man of his word, and harbored no ill will towards them, but as had become 
characteristic of his dealings with England, her people still viewed this as a threat. 
Was cooperation and possibly an alliance between Britain and Germany ever possible? 
The evidence shows that it was. Before the war between Prussia and France that unified 
Germany had even ended, British diplomat Robert Morier had mused “What untold heights of 
civilization may not the world attain with a German Empire preponderant over the destinies of 
Europe…”196 Queen Victoria herself had even rejoiced at Germany’s triumph in the war and 
identified with its people.197 George Eliot believed that the victory of Germany would bring 
about a better age which would be “marked in future histories and charts as the ‘period of 
German ascendancy.’”198 During the reign of William II, the possibility of an alliance based on 
numerous different factors remained. The first was along the lines of dynastic relations, given 
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that William II was Queen Victoria’s eldest grandson. In 1901, following the death of Queen 
Victoria, Conservative member of the House of Commons Mr. Forster spoke highly of William 
II and of his presence at the Queen’s funeral; he remarked that despite tensions that had and 
would arise between England and Germany, “Family ties have ever been honoured in this 
country, and the presence of His Imperial Majesty appealed to the people of this country with a 
striking force that [we] shall not readily forget.”199 In 1908, the Marquess of Ripon, a Liberal 
member of the House of Lords, spoke favorably of William II after a state visit, making note of 
two factors that he felt undeniably connected their two nations. 200 The first was the dynastic 
relationship between William II and Edward VII, the second connection will be discussed 
shortly.201 William II repeatedly acknowledged such dynastic times, both publicly and privately, 
and would without doubt have welcomed an alliance on such grounds. 
The second factor was one of perceived common race origin. This was, in fact, the 
second factor connecting the two nations that the Marquess of Ripon mentioned in 1908. He said 
on the matter “[We have] the connection of a common race origin; and [William II’s] visits 
afford us an opportunity of offering to the German people the strongest testimony we can give of 
our most earnest desire to live on the most friendly terms with them.”202 William II also believed 
there was a clear racial connection between the two nations and would have supported an 
alliance on such grounds; in fact, the perceived common race origin of the two peoples was a 
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major factor in William II’s dismay at the Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian alliances that 
developed.203 
Another factor in favor an alliance between the two nations was the power and protection 
it would afford both. In 1898, Conservative member of the House of Commons Sir E. Ashmead-
Bartlett argued that William II had saved the British Empire by increasing his influence in 
Turkey, thereby checking the Russians, who had long been seen as a grave threat to British 
India.204 He declared “I hold we cannot resecure our proper position, our strong and invincible 
position, among the nations of the world which we held in 1878, and from 1886 to 1892, until we 
return to the natural alliance with Germany.”205 Then in 1900, Sir Ashmead-Bartlett remarked 
that “The Concert of Europe… is impossible. It cannot exist. You cannot have a real Concert 
between Powers … whose interests are diverse,” and that “If you substitute for that Concert a 
real alliance or understanding with Germany,… then; you have an alliance with the dominant 
force not only in the East, but elsewhere, and you can practically impose your policy on 
China.”206 William II would surely have agreed to an alliance on the basis of the power it would 
grant both nations, not just militarily but economically, because it would virtually ensure the 
protection of his colonial empire and its trade. William II also desired an alliance with Britain 
which would serve as the basis of a “United States of Europe,” which would counter the growing 
economic might of the United States.207 Britain’s economic empire was also threatened by 
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America’s rise, so they surely would have been open to an alliance with Germany to maintain 
their economic dominance. 
There were, of course, a number of factors working against such cooperation or the 
formation of such an alliance. First was an aversion to being used by Germany should Britain 
cooperate. In 1903, Mr. Gibson Bowles, a Conservative in the House of Commons, remarked 
scathingly “The Venezuelan affair was one of the two instances this year in which, as on many 
occasions before, this country had been made the catspaw of Germany, apparently with the 
complacent self-admiration of the statesmen who composed the Cabinet.”208 The “Venezuelan 
affair” referred to occurred when Germany and Britain agreed to a joint military venture against 
Venezuela after it had defaulted in 1901 on bonds owed to the two nations.209 Britain and 
Germany blockaded Venezuela from December, 1902, until an agreement was reached in 
February of 1903 which guaranteed payment to the European powers.210 Such charges William II 
would surely have denied emphatically given his desire for an alliance with England and interest 
in seeing its dominance maintained, as explained in his private letter to Lord Tweedmouth in 
1908. 
Another factor working against such an alliance was a fear of Germany’s growing power 
and how it could be used against England were it to let its guard down in the case of cooperation. 
A quote from Lt.-Colonel George Kemp, a Liberal Unionist in the House of Commons, from 
1903 which was previously referenced in this paper highlights this distrust. He stated “However 
genuine and sincere the friendship of the German Emperor might be for England, it was well 
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known that the predominant feeling of the German people, combined with the increase in the 
naval power of that Empire, must be fraught with danger to this country…”211 Mr. Walter F. 
Rice, a Conservative in the House of Commons, warned in 1910 
It was the German Emperor who declared, "The trident should be in our fist." As we 
know, at this moment the trident is in our first. The German Emperor must have known 
that, and could not have been thinking of anybody else when he used that phrase. He 
having used it, we must keep it in our minds, and be ready for any emergency.212 
 
William II doubtlessly would have denied such accusations. Evidence supporting the Emperor 
can be found in his continued declarations of his desire for peace, publicly and privately, as well 
his actions and peaceful intentions, all explored in this paper.  
 Finally, the perceived warlike nature of the Emperor himself worked against such an 
alliance. In 1898, Mr. William Redmond, an Irish Parliamentary Party member of the House of 
Commons quoted previously in this paper, asked why Britain was not issuing even 
one word of protest when the German Emperor makes speeches of a high-falutin' nature 
about "mailed fists," … and sending his Royal brother across the seas with ironclads to 
conquer China? Are we to understand that when these warlike declarations and actions 
are made by the German Emperor this country is afraid to utter one single word of 
protest…?213 
 
The quote from Mr. Rice provided in the previous paragraph also serves as evidence of this 
perception. Further, though he did not hold these views himself, Mr. Noel Buxton, a Liberal 
member of the House of Commons pointed out how William II was perceived in 1911. He stated 
that there was a “feeling widespread in this country, and I am afraid prevalent to some extent in 
the official world, that the Kaiser… is some danger to the world; that he is in fact the modern 
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Napoleon Buonaparte.”214 The perception of a warlike nature was something that, as was posited 
earlier in this paper, the Emperor worked to dispel since he took the throne. With regard to the 
perception of his speeches as warlike, this paper explained that he was an extemporaneous 
speaker who often carried himself away, seeking to rouse the emotions of his audience; the result 
was that aggression was incorrectly seen in his words. Once again, William II declared publicly 
and privately his desire for peace and worked to maintain it, which is something that one who is 
truly warlike would not do. 
 There was a pattern in regards to which politicians favored an alliance or at least 
cooperation with Germany and its Emperor. In general, Liberals proved to be more welcoming to 
the idea of cooperation and were more likely to highlight the similarities between the two 
nations. Conservatives, however, were far more likely to oppose cooperation with Germany, 
express distrust in William II personally, and present criticisms of the Emperor and his nation. 
There were of course exceptions, most notably Conservative member of the House of Commons 
Sir E. Ashmead-Bartlett, who repeatedly called for an alliance with Germany based on several 
different factors during his tenure in Parliament. An appendix to this paper provides the results of 
an extensive search of the Hansard electronic database of Parliamentary debates, which range 
from the year 1803 to 2005, highlighting the aforementioned trends. 
 William II went to his grave denying that he was personally responsible for and sought 
the outbreak of the First World War. This paper both supports and refutes William II’s denial. 
With regards to his desire to bring about the First World War in some vainglorious attempt to 
assert once and for all the dominance of Germany both in Europe and on the world stage, to 
believe such a claim is ludicrous. Nothing in either the Emperor’s actions or his words suggested 
                                                





that he wanted to start a war. On the contrary, he spent his entire reign declaring his desire for 
peace both publicly and privately, and acting to preserve it in whatever way he was able. In this 
sense, this paper supports William II’s claims. 
However, though the Emperor did not seek the war for which he was blamed, through his 
relations with Great Britain, he brought it about. Again this was not intentional, it simply 
happened that William II’s words and actions were badly misunderstood. Many in Great Britain 
saw in the Emperor’s words aggression, a desire to assert Germany’s military dominance through 
an armed conflict. This led to widespread fear and distrust of William II personally in Great 
Britain, despite his repeated offerings of friendship. As this paper showed, this aggression can be 
explained away by the fact that the speeches which his British critics cited as evidence of his 
warlike nature and lack of fitness to rule were not meant to be analyzed. The Emperor spoke off 
the cuff and sought to stir the emotions of his audience, often carrying himself away in his own 
enthusiasm, leading to phrasing and imagery that would seem warlike to anyone outside his 
direct audience.  
It is an unfortunate truth that William II’s actions and words were badly misinterpreted 
by the British. Every word he spoke and every action he carried out were issued with the dual 
goals of protecting, serving, improving, and expanding the German people he held so dear, and 
of maintaining peace and stability in the world. These actions and words were often carried out 
without regard for how the wider world might view them, which proved to be the Emperor’s 
downfall. This led to the severe misinterpretations by Great Britain who helped position the 
world against Germany. War was not the Emperor’s intent, but it was the result of his policies. 
Though William II did not seek global conflagration, through his interactions and relations with 








 Through an extensive search of the Hansard Parliamentary debate database – which 
contains every debate between 1803 and 2005 – conducted over several days using the keywords 
“Kaiser” and “German Emperor,” a representative sample of the opinions of members of both 
Houses was gathered on the willingness of the parties to cooperate with Germany and its 
Emperor. For a given statement to be considered worthy of inclusion in this paper, it needed to 
meet two criteria. First, it needed to be about the Emperor himself. Mentions of different ships, 
canals, and buildings bearing either his name or his title were subject to omission. Second, the 
statement needed to be of substance. Therefore, simple mentions of the German Emperor’s 
name, as well as questions or statements of fact pertaining to the Emperor were omitted.  
For a given statement to be considered unfavorable towards William II or seen as an 
example of an unwillingness to cooperate with either William II or Germany, it needed to be 
overtly critical. For a given statement to be considered favorable towards William II or as 
evidence of a willingness to cooperate with him, such sentiments needed to be explicit. For a 
statement to be considered neutral, the bias of the speaker was not evident in their wording. 
As a result of this search, 37 different debates were identified which contained 46 
different pertinent quotes, not all of which were included in this paper. From these quotes was 
determined a general trend in politicians’ views of the German Emperor. Evidence showed that, 
in general, Conservative members of Parliament and their allies were more likely to distrust 
William II and be opposed to cooperation of any kind. Again in general, Liberal members of 
Parliament and their allies were more likely to view William II favorably and be open to 
cooperation. There were of course exceptions to the discovered trends. I present these findings in 
two ways: the first being a chart displaying the date the statement was made, the speaker, their 
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party, the sentiment of their statement, and the house of Parliament the speaker sat in; the second 
is in the form of a graph. 
The favorable expressions of Conservatives during the year 1890 were a result of the 
willingness of some to trade the island of Heligoland to William II in exchange for colonial 
concessions in Africa. The favorable Conservative expressions toward William II in the years 
1898 and 1900 were from Sir Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, who was something of a maverick within 
his party and supported an alliance with Germany and its Emperor on various grounds. After the 





Date	   Name	   Party	   Sentiment	  Toward	  
William	  II	  
House	  
August	  9,	  1888	   Lord	  Halsbury	   Conservative	   Neutral	   Lords	  
April	  4,	  1889	   Sir	  J(oseph)	  
Pease	  
Liberal	   Favorable	   Commons	  
May	  7,	  1889	   Mr.	  (Edward)	  
Gourley	  
Liberal	   Favorable	   Commons	  
May	  7,	  1889	   Admiral	  
(Richard)	  Mayne	  





Conservative	   Neutral	   Commons	  
May	  19,	  1890	   (3rd)	  Marquess	  
of	  Salisbury	  
Conservative	   Favorable	   Lords	  





Favorable	   Commons	  
July	  24,	  1890	   Mr.	  E(rnest)	  
Beckett	  
Conservative	   Unfavorable	   Commons	  
July	  24,	  1890	   Sir	  John	  
Kennaway	  
Conservative	   Favorable	   Commons	  




Conservative	   Neutral	   Commons	  





Unfavorable	   Commons	  
March	  20,	  1896	   Mr.	  (John)	  Dillon	   Irish	  
Parliamentary	  
Party	  
Neutral	   Commons	  
March	  20,	  1896	   Mr.	  (Henry)	  
Labouchere	  
Liberal	   Neutral	   Commons	  
May	  8,	  1896	   Mr.	  (Charles)	  
Darling	  
Conservative	   Unfavorable	   Commons	  
March	  1,	  1898	   Sir	  E(llis)	  
Ashmead-­‐
Bartlett	  
Conservative	   Favorable	   Commons	  





Unfavorable	   Commons	  
April	  29,	  1898	   Sir	  E(llis)	  
Ashmead-­‐
Bartlett	  
Conservative	   Favorable	   Commons	  
July	  23,	  1900	   Mr.	  John	  Burns	   Liberal	   Neutral	   Commons	  









Neutral	   Commons	  
August	  2,	  1900	   Sir	  E(llis)	  
Ashmead-­‐
Bartlett	  






Conservative	   Favorable	   Commons	  
December	  7,	  
1900	  










Conservative	   Unfavorable	   Commons	  
May	  28,	  1902	   Mr.	  Charles	  
Wilson	  





Liberal	  Unionist	   Unfavorable	   Commons	  
July	  23,	  1903	   Mr.	  Gibson	  
Bowles	  
Conservative	   Unfavorable	   Commons	  
May	  16,	  1904	   Sir	  Charles	  Dilke	   Liberal	   Favorable	   Commons	  
March	  29,	  1906	   (2nd)	  Viscount	  
Halifax	  










Liberal	   Favorable	   Lords	  
January	  29,	  
1908	  
Lord	  Airedale	   Liberal	   Favorable	   Lords	  
March	  2,	  1908	   Sir	  John	  Brunner	   Liberal	   Favorable	   Commons	  
March	  9,	  1908	   (5th)	  Earl	  of	  
Rosebery	  
Liberal	   Favorable	   Lords	  
March	  9,	  1908	   Lord	  
Tweedmouth	  








Unfavorable	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